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Abstract: Exploring the systematic connections between 
Aristotle’s theory and practice of science has emerged as an 
important concern in recent years. On the one hand, we can 
invoke the theory of the Posterior Analytics to motivate specific 
moves that Aristotle makes in the course of his actual 
investigation of the natural world. On the other, we can use 
Aristotle’s practice of science to illuminate the theory of the 
Posterior Analytics, which is presented in a notoriously abstract, and 
at times also elliptical, way. I would like to contribute to this 
interpretative tradition with a study of how Aristotle explains the 
phenomenon of sleep and waking. 
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1. THE BIOLOGICAL ORIENTATION OF THE  DE SOMNO 
 
Aristotle’s theoretical motivations for dealing with sleep 
and waking in the natural investigation transmitted to us 
with the Latin title De somno et vigilia (hereafter De somno) are 
clearly stated at the outset of the first book of his work On 
the Parts of Animals (PA I). There, Aristotle is quite emphatic 
on the need to engage in a separate, and indeed common, 
study of certain natural phenomena pertaining to animal 
life. These phenomena are to be studied separately, and in 
common, because they are shared by many, if not all, 
animals.1 By engaging in such a study Aristotle hopes to 
obtain causal explanations that range across different kinds 
of animals. By his lights, causal explanations that are 
common are necessary not only to avoid tedious repetitions 
but also to shed light on salient explanatory features that 
might be otherwise missed. Surprisingly enough, Aristotle is 
not explicit about his second reason in PA I. While he 
stresses the importance of avoiding repetitions, he does not 
insist, as one might expect, on the fact that there are certain 
salient features that would be missed if they were not 
studied separately and at the right level of generality. Still, 
there is no doubt that this second reason is, at least for 
Aristotle, as important as the first one. 
It is worth elaborating on this second reason, and on the 
motivations for treating certain features of animal life in 
common. An explicit discussion of this explanatory 
commitment is found in the first book of the Posterior 
Analytics (APost I). There, Aristotle introduces the 
methodological principle that explanations must be given at 
the proper level of generality. He illustrates this principle 
with the help of the property of having the internal angles 
equal to two right angles. Since this property belongs to all 
triangles, it belongs to equilateral, isosceles, and scalene 
                                                 
1 PA I 639a15-29.  
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triangles. But it does not belong to these triangles in virtue 
of the fact that they are equilateral, isosceles, or scalene 
triangles. Rather, it belongs to them because they are 
triangles. This geometrical example helps us see that there 
is a common explanatory level beyond that of equilateral, 
isosceles, and scalene triangles. We reach this common 
explanatory level by ignoring those facts that are specific to 
equilateral, isosceles, and scalene triangles. More to the 
point: we ignore those facts by treating equilateral, 
isosceles, and scalene triangles insofar as they are triangles. 
We can think of such a treatment of triangles as a general 
study of triangles.2 
It is not difficult to see why sleep and waking are to be 
studied in common for all animals. Sleep and waking are 
closely related to the activity of perceiving. We know, in 
particular, that someone (or something) is awake or asleep 
based on the presence or absence of the activity of 
perceiving. But perceiving is the activity that, at least for 
Aristotle, demarcates animal life (including human life) 
from plant life. Aristotle has defended this claim in his 
study of the soul (the De anima). This claim is to be taken as 
a foundational thesis for the project attempted in the De 
somno, since it establishes the biological orientation of the 
entire work. More directly, even when Aristotle 
concentrates his attention on what happens in the case of 
the human body, he is committed to developing a causal 
account that can be extended to all animals. Aristotle 
focuses on the human body because he is committed to the 
methodological principles that all investigations ought to 
start from the study of that which is most developed and as 
such is also better in nature. An especially clear formulation 
of this methodological principle can be found in a fragment 
from the now lost Protrepticus: 
                                                 
2 APost I 5, 74a4-6 combined with 74a16-17.  
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Prior things are always more knowable than 
posterior things, what is better in nature <is 
more knowable> than what is worse: knowledge 
is of what is organized and more determinate than of 
the opposites. (Aristotle, Protr. B 33 Düring 
(Iamblichus, Protr. 38.7-8 and De comm math sc. 
81-7-11; italics are mine)3 
 
By Aristotle’s lights, the human body is the most 
developed, and so the most complete, living body. It can 
serve as a guideline, and indeed a model, for the study of 
the functioning of animal bodies. More specifically, and 
more precisely, Aristotle is confident that the results 
reached in the course of the study of the human body can 
be extended to all blooded animals—that is, all the animals 
that possess a heart. Moreover, by deploying analogical 
reasoning, Aristotle is able to extend the results reached in 
the course of the study of the blooded animals to the case 
of bloodless animals—that is, all the animals that possess 
something that is functionally analogous to a heart.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 I am using the translation offered by D. S. Hutchinson and 
Monte R. Johnson in their still provisional reconstruction of 
Aristotle, Protrepticus or Exhortation to Philosophy, which is available 
online at the following address: http://www.protrepticus.info/. 
Additional passages from the Aristotelian corpus can be offered in 
which we are told that the order of explanation must follow the 
order of nature, with the order of nature having thus normative 
force over the order of exposition. See, e.g., GA 2.4, 737b25-27. 
For a recent discussion of this methodological principle, I refer 
the reader to Leunissen 2017: 56-74 (especially 58-66). 
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2. THE ὅτι-stage OF THE DE SOMNO 
 
In the opening lines of the De somno, Aristotle sets for 
himself the goal of establishing what sleep and waking are, 
and why both have to be present in all animals. His stated 
goal is to achieve a scientific definition of sleep and waking 
that tells us why animals are affected by both sleep and 
waking. That the search for a definition and the search for 
an explanation converge toward one and the same result is 
no surprise. At the beginning of the second book of the 
Posterior Analytics, Aristotle has already argued that knowing 
the what-it-is is the same as knowing the why-it-is: 
 
“[…] it is clear that the what-it-is (τί ἐστι) and 
the why-it-is (διὰ τί ἐστι) are the same. What 
is a <lunar> eclipse? Privation of the moon’s 
light by the interposition of the earth. What is 
the reason of the <lunar> eclipse? Or: Why 
does the moon suffer an eclipsed? Because of 
the failure of light due to the interposition of 
the earth.” (APost. II 1, 90a24-27. Cf APost. II 
8, 93a4) 
  
But how should we proceed in our search for the 
explanation, and indeed definition, of sleep and waking? In 
the second book of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle makes it 
clear that before embarking on the search for any 
explanation or definition, the investigator has first to 
establish what is to be explained or defined. This is exactly 
what Aristotle does at the outset of the De somno. With the 
exception of the opening paragraph,4 the remainder of the 
                                                 
4 The opening paragraph of the De somno makes it clear that the 
three short essays we usually refer to as De somno, De insomniis, and 
the De divinatione per somnum are part of one and the same 
explanatory project. Once we have explained what sleep is, and 
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first chapter is entirely devoted to identifying the scientific 
fact of sleep and waking. By “scientific fact” I do not 
simply mean an explicable fact; rather, I mean a fact that is 
amenable to an explanation in the context of a science. The 
force of this point becomes apparent as soon as we reflect 
on the strictures that Aristotle imposes on the scientific 
inquiry and reflect, in particular, on the methodological 
requirement that an explanation of sleep and waking should 
be given in common for all animals. 
In outline, the argumentative strategy that Aristotle 
follows in the first chapter of the De somno consists of the 
following three steps.  
First step: Aristotle establishes that waking and sleep are 
contraries, and that what receives one of the two contraries 
receives also the other (but it does not, and indeed cannot, 
receive both at the same time). This is a general point, and a 
point that Aristotle makes without invoking any particular 
principle of natural philosophy. Rather, Aristotle secures 
this result by invoking a logical property shared by any 
chance pair of contraries.5  
                                                                                      
why it occurs in animals (De somno), we need to inquire what 
dream is, trying to explain why sometimes one and the same 
person does and does not dream in sleep (De insomniis); last but 
not least, we have also to deal with the question whether it is true 
that it is possible to foresee the future in dreams (De divinatione per 
somnum). At the end of the De divinatione per somnum, we are told 
that all the items on the agenda outlined at the beginning of the 
De somno, namely the nature and causes sleep and dream, and in 
addition divination as a result of episode of dreaming, have been 
discussed.  
5 In the De somno, Aristotle mentions the following pairs of 
contraries: health and sickness, beauty and ugliness, strength and 
weakness, sight and blindness, hearing and deafness (1, 453b30-
31). 
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Second step: What is specific about the phenomena of 
sleep and waking is that they depend on the activity of 
perceiving. Aristotle establishes this point by means of the 
following observation: we know that someone (or 
something) is awake or asleep based on the presence or 
absence of the activity of perceiving. With this observation, 
Aristotle secures two results. The first is that, since the 
activity of perceiving is proper neither to the soul nor to 
the body but it entails both, sleep and waking are to be 
studied as part of the explanatory project that is concerned 
with “what is common to the soul and the body.”6 As a 
result, we can say that this explanatory project is clearly 
distinct from the one attempted in the De anima. While in 
the De anima Aristotle is concerned with the soul as the 
principle of life, in the De somno he is concerned with 
natural phenomena that are common to both the soul and 
the body, the explanation of which depends at least in part 
on the results achieved in the study of the soul.7 A full 
appreciation of the relationship between the two projects 
helps us understand why in the De somno Aristotle invokes 
the De anima for the claim that the capacity of perception 
belongs to animals to the exclusion of plants. This claim is 
enough to secure the following important result: animals 
alone are affected by sleep and waking.  
Third step: No animal can be always asleep or always 
awake, but each and every one of them must alternate sleep 
and waking. Aristotle argues that the capacity for 
                                                 
6 The opening lines of the De sensu suggest that Aristotle regarded 
what is common to the soul and the body a discrete investigative 
domain. For more on the opening lines of the De sensu and their 
significance for how Aristotle conceives of his task in the Parva 
naturalia, I refer the reader to Johansen 2006: 141-164. 
7 More on the relation between the project attempted in the Parva 
naturalia and the De anima in Falcon 2019: 1-15. 
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perception cannot be exercised continuously, and hence 
periods of activity (waking) must be followed by periods of 
inactivity (sleep). This result is secured by invoking the 
following general principle: if x possesses a natural 
function, then there is also a natural time-limit for the 
exercise of that function; when the function is excercised 
beyond that time-limit, x is incapacitated. Aristotle does not 
pause to elaborate on the epistemological status of this 
principle; nor does he try to qualify it, by saying that it is a 
natural principle, or to restrict it by adding that this is a 
principle that applies to the sublunary world to the 
exclusion of the celestial world. The overall impression is 
that Aristotle is invoking a general principle of natural 
philosophy that, at least by his lights, is empirically evident. 
His claim is that things such as eyes, hands, and everything else 
with a determinate function, is given a time-limit beyond which 
they are incapacitated.  
With the help of these three steps, Aristotle has secured 
the scientific fact that he will attempt to explain in the rest of 
the De somno—namely, that all animals alternate periods of 
sleep and periods of waking. It should not go unnoticed 
that Aristotle has also achieved an initial characterization of 
the phenomena of sleep and waking. More directly, if the 
animal is defined by possession of the capacity for 
perception, sleep is a fettering or an immobilization of 
perception, whereas waking is the release and liberation of 
perception: 
 
That all animals partake of sleep is clear from 
these considerations: for the animal is defined 
by the possession of perception, and we say 
that sleep is in a certain way an immobilization 
(ἀκινησία) and like a fettering (δεσμόν) of 
perception, whereas <we say that> its 
liberation and release is waking. (De somno 1, 
454b24-27) 
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Needless to say, this is just a first, preliminary account 
of sleep and waking. At best, this account gives us an initial 
grasp of what has to be studied. Armed with this initial 
grasp of the phenomenon of sleep and waking, we are in 
the position to begin our search for its causes. Our 
cognitive state at this stage of the investigation is not unlike 
the one that Aristotle ascribes to those who have non-
accidental knowledge of the existence of something. 
Consider the following passage from APost II 8: 
 
“<It> is impossible to know what a thing is 
when we are ignorant that it exists. Sometimes 
we grasp that something exists in an 
accidental way, and sometimes by grasping 
something of the thing itself (for instance, that 
thunder is a certain kind of noise in the 
clouds, that eclipse is a certain kind of loss of 
light, that the human being is a certain kind of 
animal, or that the soul is that which moves 
itself). [...] To search for what something is 
without grasping that it exists is to search for 
nothing. But when we grasp something <of 
the thing itself> it is easy to search. Thus, as 
we are aware that something exists, so is our 
awareness directed toward what it is.” (APost 
II 8, 93a20-29)8 
 
In this passage, Aristotle argues that we can attempt to 
offer a definition of what something is only when we are 
aware of its existence. In addition, he claims that when we 
                                                 
8 The seminal papers on this passage, and its implications for 
Aristotle’s scientific method, are Bolton 1976: 514-544, and 
Bolton 1987: 120-166. See also Sorabji 1981: 213-219, Demoss 
and Devereux 1988: 133-154, and Charles 2000: 23-56.  
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know in a non-accidental way that a thing exists, we grasp 
something of the thing itself (93a22) and our awareness is 
directed toward what the thing is (93a28-29). In this case, 
our non-accidental knowledge that the thing exists comes 
with some provisional understanding of what it is. This 
understanding is conveyed by a preliminary account. 
Aristotle’s examples are that thunder is a certain kind of 
noise in the clouds, eclipse is a certain kind of loss of light, 
and the human being is a certain kind of animal.9  
What we are told about sleep and waking in the De 
somno (1, 454b24-27) is not unlike these other definitions in 
that it gives us a fix on the phenomenon under 
investigation by way of an initial characterization of the 
place of sleep and waking in animal life.10 By saying that 
sleep is in a certain way an immobilization and is like a 
                                                 
9 APost II 8, 93a23-24. The definition of the soul as self-mover is 
slightly more problematic. Aristotle’s first and foremost concern 
in the first book of the De anima is to block the route that leads to 
the definition of the soul as a self-mover. In fact, one of the most 
important outcomes of the investigation conducted in that work 
is the conclusion that the soul is an unmoved mover (and hence it 
is not a self-mover). Perhaps it is possible to defend the example 
offered in the Posterior Analytics by saying that the definition of 
soul as a self-mover reflects an early understanding of the soul 
based, among other things, on an ἔνδοξον about the nature of 
the soul. This definition grasps something of the thing itself to 
the extent that it enables us to see that the soul is a principle of 
motion. But it also reflects a defective understanding of the soul. 
It will be Aristotle’s job to correct this defective understanding in 
the first book of the De anima.  
10 Bolton 1976: “the chief function of nominal definitions is to 
enable scientific inquiry to get off the ground. Nominal 
definitions encapsulate information which the scientist has about 
an entity before he has an account of its nature or essence. This 
enables the scientist to fix on a suitable object for further 
investigation” (521). 
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fettering of perception, and arguing that waking is the 
release and liberation of perception, Aristotle establishes a 
link not only between sleep and perception but also 
between sleep and waking. With the help of this 
characterization, he can now work toward acquiring 
scientific knowledge of what sleep is. 
To the extent that the link between sleep and waking, 
on the one hand, and perception, on the other, is essential 
to our understanding of the phenomena of sleep and 
waking, we can say that we have grasped something of the 
thing itself. This is in line with the methodological 
requirement outlined in the Posterior Analytics: by 
establishing that something is the case, we are also grasping 
something of the thing itself.  
The qualification that Aristotle adds to his first 
definition of sleep calls for a few words of elaboration. 
According to Aristotle, “we say that sleep is in a certain way 
(τρόπον τινα) an immobilization and is like (οἷον) a 
fettering of perception.” The words highlighted in italics 
are to be taken as sign of a lacuna that is to be filled in with 
the relevant content as the inquiry proceeds from the ὅτι-
stage to the διότι-stage of inquiry. In other words, the first, 
still provisional, definition of sleep captures a relevant 
aspect of sleep while at the same time it also lacks in 
content.11 Furthermore, I do not think that “we say” can be 
taken to be equivalent to “we ordinary people say” that sleep 
is in a certain way an immobilization and like a fettering of 
                                                 
11 I believe that this is also the message conveyed by Aristotle’s 
examples in the Posterior Analytics. When Aristotle says that 
thunder is a certain kind (τις) of noise in the clouds, eclipse is a 
certain kind (τις) of loss of light, and the human being is a certain 
kind (τι) of animal, he signals a lacuna to be filled in the course of 
the investigation. Put differently, “to be a certain kind of ….” is a 
place-holder for additional information to be supplied at a later 
stage. Cf. Charles 2000: 38n24. 
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perception. Perception is understood by Aristotle as a 
capacity that defines animals to the exclusion of plants. 
This is far from being a trivial thesis, let alone a widely 
shared view at the time. Rather, it is an important scientific 
truth that Aristotle secures in the De anima and applies in 
the De somno. Even if it is possible that the first and still 
provisional, definition of sleep captures some of the pre-
theoretical intuitions ordinary people share on the nature of 
sleep, the fact that it is a commonly shared view, or even an 
ἔνδοξον, is not what interests Aristotle. 
So far I have argued that the first chapter of the De 
somno is concerned with the ὅτι-stage of his investigation, 
and that this chapter provides valuable insights into how 
the relevant scientific fact is established by Aristotle. In 
connection with the latter point, it should be added that 
Aristotle is greatly concerned with the precise extension of 
what is to be explained. His language is reminiscent of the 
way in which scientific facts are established in the Historia 
animalium (HA). As in the HA, Aristotle is here looking for 
correlations between sleep and other features. In particular, 
he establishes a correlation between having eyes and 
undergoing periods of sleep: 
 
“Nearly all other animals clearly partake of 
sleep whether they live in water, in air, or on 
land: fishes of all kinds and the soft-bodied 
animals (μαλάκια) are observed undergoing 
period of sleep, and as many as (ὅσα) have 
eyes, all (πάντα) undergo periods of sleep;12 
                                                 
12 The linguistic pattern “πάντα ... ὅσα” is strongly reminiscent of 
the way in which Aristotle establishes his scientific facts in HA.  
For more on this topic, I refer the reader to Lennox [electronic 
resource]: “Aristotle appears to use the sentence form “as many 
as are X, all have Y” for quite a specific reason. It is not just to 
note a universal correlation; it is to do so while leaving the 
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for even the animals that have eyes made of a 
hard substance (σκληρόφθαλμα)13 and insects 
manifestly assume the posture of sleep, 
although for all these animals these periods 
can be very brief, which is why it may escape 
us whether they partake of sleep or not. As 
for the hard-shelled animals (ὀστρακοδέρμα), 
it is not yet perceptually clear whether they 
sleep. However, if one has found the 
foregoing argument convincing, then one will 
be persuaded by it.” (De somno 1, 454b14-23) 
 
In this passage, Aristotle invokes—vigorously and 
unequivocally—the authority of observation for the claim 
that all, or nearly all, animals are observed undergoing 
periods of sleep. I say “nearly all animals” because the case 
of the hard-shelled animals is a difficult one. The perceptual 
data available to Aristotle do not suffice to establish 
whether these animals partake in sleep. But even in this 
case observation remains the necessary and ultimate 
authority. Still, Aristotle is willing to admit that he has built 
a convincing case for the thesis that all animals, including 
the ὀστρακοδέρμα, undergo periods of sleep.   
 
 
                                                                                      
extension of the correlation open—a brilliant methodological 
innovation. New animals with the correlation can be discovered 
but the generalization will not change.” 
13 The σκληρόφθαλμα may be considered a difficult case because 
they do not have eye-coverings that help us determine whether 
these animals sleep or not. In this case, their bodily posture may 
be taken to be evidence that they are asleep. On σκληρόφθαλμα, 
see PA II 13-15.  
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3. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF SLEEP: THE PRIMARY 
SUBJECT OF SLEEP 
 
The second chapter of the De somno marks the beginning 
of the διότι-stage of Aristotle’s inquiry:  
 
It is now to be investigated why (διὰ τί) one 
sleeps and wakes and on account of what 
sense—or what senses if there is more than 
one—one sleeps and wakes. (De somno 2, 
455a4-5) 
 
The passage is an invitation to identify which one of the 
five senses is responsible for the phenomena of sleep and 
waking. Aristotle does not respond to this invitation by 
singling out any one of the individual senses, or a particular 
combination of them. For one thing, all animals are 
affected by sleep and waking, but not all of them have all 
five senses. For another, when an animal is asleep, all its 
senses are affected in the same way. This second point can 
be restated by saying that sleep is conceived by Aristotle as 
a state of total incapacitation. When the animal is asleep, 
none of its senses is working.  
A detailed analysis of the argument for the claim that 
sleep is an affection of the common sense exceeds the 
scope of this paper.14 Here suffice it to say that Aristotle is 
able to individuate the part of the perceptual system that is 
directly affected by sleep and waking: the incapacitation 
associated with sleep happens neither in any chance sense-
organ nor from any chance cause but it happens in the 
primary sense-organ (2, 455b8-11). It should not be 
overlooked that the lacuna deliberately left in the initial 
characterization of sleep and waking—the one that gave us 
                                                 
14 For a recent in-depth analysis of Aristotle’s argument, I refer 
the reader to Gregoric (2007): 163-173. 
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a fix on these phenomena—is being filled as the 
investigation progresses. Aristotle is now able to locate 
where the phenomena under investigation take place. He 
can say that sleep and waking are affections of the primary 
sense-organ. We can restate this last point by saying that, at 
this stage of the inquiry, Aristotle is able identify the primary 
subject that is affected by both sleep and waking.15 With the 
help of this last observation, we can perhaps rework the 
initial characterization of sleep and waking as follows: sleep 
is an immobilization or fettering of the first sense-organ, 
whereas its release is waking. 
There is no doubt that we have made some progress in 
our search for a definition—and indeed explanation—of 
the phenomenon of sleep. At this stage of our inquiry, we 
can confidently say that sleep is not simply a state in which 
the senses are not being used. Rather, it is a state in which 
the senses cannot be used. Moreover, they cannot be used 
because the primary sense-organ is somehow affected. Still, 
we are far from having reached a satisfactory explanation of 
this state. We would like to know, for instance, what 
distinguishes this particular state from other states of 
unconsciousness where our ability to perceive is equally 
affected—for instance, fainting, or the state of 
unconsciousness that Aristotle calls ἔκνοια (suffocation or 
asphyxia). The only way to make progress on this front is to 
look for the cause (or causes) of sleep. It is only when we 
will have found the cause (or causes) of sleep that we may 
be able not only to say how sleep is different from these 
other states of unconsciousness but also to clarify what role 
sleep has in animal life.  
 
                                                 
15 This is “the underlier” in the triadic scheme <AFFECTION, 
UNDERLIER, AGENT> discussed in Code 2015: 11-47 
(especially 16-23). 
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4. ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITION OF SLEEP  
 
At this point, Aristotle resumes the causal investigation 
announced at the beginning of the second chapter of the 
De somno. He does so by promising not only a causal 
explanation but also a definition of sleep: it must be said on 
account of what cause sleep occurs, and what sort of affection it is (2, 
455b13-14). 
We have already seen that, in the first chapter of the De 
somno, Aristotle introduces the principle that no natural 
capacity can be exercised indefinitely but rather periods of 
activity must be followed by periods of inactivity. Aristotle 
builds on this principle by arguing that the periods of 
inactivity are for the sake of the periods of activity. More 
specifically, the periods of sleep are for the sake of the 
periods of waking.16 Waking is understood as the full, and 
indeed optimal, exercise of the perceptual capacities. As a 
result, saying that sleep is for the sake of waking is 
equivalent to saying that the optimal exercise of the 
perceptual capacities is contingent on having adequate 
periods of sleep. In other words, periods of sleep are 
necessary if the optimal exercise of the perceptual capacites 
is to obtain: 
 
It is necessary for sleep to belong to every 
animal. I mean “necessity” in a conditional 
sense (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως)—namely, if the animal 
is to have its own nature, then certain things 
must belong to it of necessity; moreover, since 
                                                 
16 Aristotle reaches this result by applying the teleological 
principle that nature does nothing in vain (“we say that nature acts 
for the sake of an end, and this end is a good,” 455b17-18). For 
more on this principle and the function it plays in Aristotle’s 
search for teleological explanations, see the alternative accounts 
offered in Lennox 2001: 182-204 and Leunissen 2010: 119-135.  
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these things belong, others must belong [as 
well]. (De somno 2, 455b25-27)  
 
Perhaps this passage can be restated in the following way: 
since the capacity for perception is part of the essential 
nature of the animal (recall that to be an animal is to be 
able to perceive), the presence of certain other things is 
necessary—in primis a living body equipped with sense-
organs. But it is precisely because the possession, and 
indeed optimal use, of the capacity for perception requires 
such a body that sleep, understood as the periodical shut 
down of the sense-organs for the sake of recovery, is 
needed. In other words, the teleological explanation of 
sleep is a direct consequence of the Aristotelian insight that 
perception necessarily requires a materially constituted 
organ or tool—namely, a certain kind of living body, and 
that such an organ or tool cannot function without periods 
of rest.17 This insight is encapsulated in Aristotle’s claim 
that sleep is for the preservation of the animals (2, 455b22).  
By invoking a teleological explanation of sleep, Aristotle 
has made some progress toward giving an explanation of 
the place that sleep has in animal life. However, he has told 
us virtually nothing about the way in which episodes of 
sleep and waking occur. Still, it is clear that this question 
cannot be further avoided. Quite the opposite, it follows 
from a general feature of teleology and conditional 
necessity in Aristotle. Recall that, at least for Aristotle, there 
is more than one level of conditional necessity governed by 
teleology in Aristotle. Consider, in particular, the following 
two conditional statements: 
 
(1) If the animal is to perform its characteristic 
activities optimally, then it must take some rest (in 
                                                 
17 Cf. Everson 2007: 519. 
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the form of sleep, understood as the temporary 
shutting down of the of sense-organs). 
 
(2) If the animal must take some rest (in the form of 
sleep, understood as the temporary shutting down of 
the sense-organs), certain physiological processes 
must take place in its body. 
 
At this point of the inquiry, Aristotle moves from the first 
to the second level of conditional necessity. As a result, he 
turns his attention to the physiological processes required 
for episodes of sleep and waking to occur.18 The transition 
to this new task is marked by the promise to concentrate on 
the processes and activities that take place in the body of 
the animal when the latter is affected by sleep and waking 
(2, 455b28-31).  
First, Aristotle establishes what part of the body is 
directly affected by sleep and waking. Aristotle is able to 
answer this question because he has already established that 
sleep and waking are an affection of the controlling sense-
organ. In blooded animals, the primary sense-organ is 
located in the region around the heart. As for bloodless 
animals, they do not have a heart but something that is 
functionally analogous to it. If, therefore, Aristotle is able to 
explain what happens in the bodies of blooded animals 
when episodes of sleep and waking occur, he is also able to 
explain, by means of analogous reasoning, what happens 
also in bloodless animals. Aristotle states his explanatory 
strategy in the following passage:  
 
                                                 
18 I owe this point to Lucas Angioni. His comments helped me 
see how to negotiate the transition from the first to the second 
level of conditional necessity at this particular juncture of 
Aristotle’s argument.  
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One should assume that the causes of the 
affection [sc. sleep and waking] in other 
animals are as they are in blooded animals—
either the same or analogous—and that the 
causes in blooded animals are those in human 
beings. Hence, one should consider the entire 
subject starting from them [sc. human beings]. 
(De somno 2, 455b31-34) 
 
Next, Aristotle turns his attention to the processes that give 
rise to single episodes of sleep and waking, which amounts 
to looking for the whence of sleep and waking (De somno 3, 
456a30-33). This search is equivalent to a search for the 
moving (or efficient) cause of sleep and waking.19 Aristotle 
makes it clear that sleep and waking are causally linked to 
nutrition and the transformation of nourishment into blood 
(or into its analogous substance in bloodless animals).20 A 
detailed account of the physiological processes involved in 
the assimilation of nourishment and its transformation into 
blood are not needed in the De somno. What we need to 
know in connection with the study of sleep and waking is 
only this:  
 
When nourishment enters into the parts that 
are fitted for its reception, an exhalation 
(ἀναθυμίασις) arising from the nourishment 
                                                 
19 This is “the agent” in the triadic scheme <AFFECTION, 
UNDERLIER, AGENT> discussed in Code 2015: 11-47 
(especially 16-23). 
20 The following statement from the De somno encapsulates how 
Aristotle sees the relationship between nourishment and blood: 
“nourishment in its ultimate form is: in blooded animals, the 
natural substance blood, and in bloodless animals that which is 
analogous to it.” (3, 456a34-36).  
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enters into the veins, and there it undergoes a 
change and is transformed into blood, which 
eventually reaches the source [of all blood, sc. 
the heart]. (De somno 2, 456b2-5)21 
 
To understand the physiological process outlined in this 
passage we have to keep in mind the function that Aristotle 
assigns to the brain. The brain is the coldest among the 
parts of the body and exists in the body for the sake of 
cooling the entire organism.22 When the exhalation 
                                                 
21 The reader should compare what Aristotle says in the De somno 
with the following passage from PA: “as the nourishment exhales 
upward through the veins, the residue from it becomes cooled 
owing to the specific nature of this place <sc. the brain>, and 
produces fluxes of phlegm and serum. And we should be justified 
in maintaining that this process resembles, on a small scale, the 
one which produces rain-showers. Damp vapour exhales up from 
the earth and is carried into the upper regions by the heat; and 
when it reaches the cold air up it condenses back again into water 
owing to the cold and pours down toward the earth” (PA II 7, 
653a1-8). 
22 Here is what Aristotle says on the function of the brain in PA: 
“Everything needs something to counterbalance it, so that it may 
achieve proportion and the mean; […] for this reason nature has 
contrived the brain to counterbalance the region of the heart and 
the heat in it; and this is why animals have a brain, the 
composition of which is a combination of water and earth. 
Hence, although all blooded animals have a brain, practically 
none of the others has (unless it be just a counterpart, as in the 
case of the octopus), for since they lack blood they have but little 
heat” (PA II 7, 652a20-26). Among other things, this passage 
helps us understand that blooded animals must have both a heart 
and a brain. With the exception of a few cases (most notably, the 
octopus), bloodless animals do not have a brain. In their case, 
cooling takes place in some another way. In the De somno, 
Aristotle deals with cooling in bloodless animals at 2, 456a6-21. 
 Definition, Explanation, and Scientific Method 536 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 42, n. 4, pp. 516-543, Oct-Dec. 2019. 
produced in the process of digestion enters into the veins, 
it becomes a warm substance moving up quickly through 
the veins toward the upper part of the body. When it has 
reached the brain, this hot substance is cooled off.23 At that 
point this substance, which will at some point be 
transformed into blood, is ready to flow inward toward the 
heart. Sleep happens in connection with the sudden 
concentration of blood in the region around the heart. The 
brain produces sleeps but it is not itself affected by sleep. 
What is affected by sleep is the heart because the latter is 
the seat of the common sense-organ. 24 
We can go further in describing what Aristotle envisions 
happening in the body in connection with episodes of sleep 
and waking. Aristotle argues that one awakes when the 
separation of the thinner blood from the thicker blood is 
completed (3, 458a12). Aristotle seems to think that an 
episode of sleep occurs as a result of the fact that a large 
quantity of blood in need of separation has flooded the 
region around the heart; when the separation is completed, 
an episode of waking ensues: 
                                                 
23 Based on what Aristotle says in De somno 3, 458a5-10. It is 
suggestive to think that the brain works like a radiator, the 
function of which is to cool the body off. The brain is 
surrounded by a dense network of veins. By being forced to flow 
through these narrow passages, the hot substance is cooled off.  
Cf. HA 495 a 5-11: “In all animals, the brain is bloodless; there is 
not a single vein in it, and it feels cold to the touch […] the 
membrane surrounding it is patterned with little veins.”  
24 “It is this part [sc. brain] which produces sleep in animals (or if 
there is no brain its analogous). It cools the onflow of blood 
which comes from the nourishment (or else is due to other 
causes of the same sort) and weighs down the part where it is 
(that is why whe a person is sleepy his head is weighed down) and 
causes the hot substance to escape below together with the 
blood” (PA II 7 653a11-16). 
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Sleep occurs because the blood after the 
introduction of nourishment is especially in 
need of separation and lasts until the thinner 
part has been separated off into the upper 
parts of the body and the thicker one into the 
lower parts. When this has taken place, 
animals awake from sleep being released from 
the heaviness consequent on taking in food. 
(De somno 3, 458a21-25) 
 
We have now reached the moving or efficient cause of an 
episode of sleep. By Aristotle’s lights, this cause is a sudden 
and massive25 flow of blood that affects the primary sense-
organ caused by26 the bodily substance carried upward by 
the action of connate heat (De somno 3, 458a26-27). 
Although the role of connate heat was not discussed up to 
now, we should not be surprised to find it mentioned in the 
final, and indeed most accurate, description of the cause of 
sleep. Aristotle considers digestion to be a case of 
concoction (πέψις). But concoction requires a principle that 
acts on the nourishment by cooking it. This hot principle is 
connate heat (also known as vital heat).  
The key term introduced in the final description of the 
cause of an episode of sleeping is ἀντιπερίστασις. 27. In this 
                                                 
25 The Greek ἀθρόως may convey at once the notion of a 
“sudden” and “massive” event. Gallop 1996: en masse; Everson 
2007: en bloc. 
26 I retain the ὑπό transmitted by all the MSS (pace Ross 1955, 
who brackets it, and Gallop 1996, who omits it). Cf. also Code 
2015: 43. 
27 For Aristotle, ἀντιπερίστασις is a terminus technicus. He did not 
coin it (see Phys. VIII 10, 267a15-16). Aristotle criticizes Plato for 
explaining breathing and projectile motion by means of 
ἀντιπερίστασις (respectively in Resp. 6, 472b6-31 and Phys. IV 8, 
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case, ἀντιπερίστασις refers to the process of cooling off 
and the subsequent flowing down of what had previously 
moved up as a result of the action of the connate heat. If 
this is correct, ἀντιπερίστασις does not refer to a single 
thing, or to a single event, but rather to a sequence of 
events resulting in a temporary paralysis (κατάληψις) of the 
primary sense organ. This sequence of events is triggered 
by the action of the connate heat. 
The relative complexity of the cause of sleep does not 
set sleep apart from the cases discussed in the Posterior 
Analytics. Let us briefly return to the example of a lunar 
eclipse. In this case, the διὰ τί question takes the following 
forms: What is the cause of a lunar eclipse? Or: Why does 
the moon suffer an eclipse? The answer is: Because of the 
failure of light due to the interposition of the earth (APost 
II 1, 90a16-18). Similar questions can be asked in 
                                                                                      
215a14-15). Plato, who speaks of περίωσις (pushing around) 
rather than ἀντιπερίστασις, explains a number of biological and 
physical phenomena in terms of ἀντιπερίστασις: in addition to 
breathing and projectile motion, Plato lists acoustics, water 
currents, the descent of thunderbolts, and the alleged attraction 
exercised by amber and the lodestone (Tim. 79 A-80 C). Aristotle 
narrows down the use of ἀντιπερίστασις. He invokes it to 
explain meteorological phenomena such as winds. It is no 
coincidence that both in the case of winds and in the case of 
sleep Aristotle envisions exhalations (ἀναθυμίασεις) being 
involved in the explanation. In fact, he is happy to speak of an 
analogy between what happens in the human body and in the 
case of winds (Meteor. II 4, 360b22-26). In the end, however, 
Aristotle does not give us a definition of ἀντιπερίστασις. 
Simplicius supplies it for him: “ἀντιπερίστασις occurs when one 
body is expelled from its place by another and they exchange 
places and the one that expelled the other stands in the place of 
what was expelled.” (Simplicius, In Phys. 135031-33, trans. 
Richard McKirahan) 
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connection with sleep: What is the cause of sleep? Why 
does the primary sense-organ suffer a temporary 
incapacitation? The answer is: Because of the sudden and 
massive ἀντιπερίστασις caused by the bodily substance 
carried upward by the action of the connate heat (De somno 
3, 458a26-27). What sets apart the case of sleep is that 
sleep, unlike a lunar eclipse (or a thunder), has a final cause 
and this final cause must appear in the final definition (τί 
ἐστι) of sleep.  
It is very telling that Aristotle’s investigation of sleep 
ends with a causal definition of sleep. This is also the most 
complete—indeed most precise—definition of sleep. It 
makes reference to both the final and the moving (or 
efficient) cause of sleep. It also identifies the primary 
subject affected by sleep—namely, the heart (or whatever is 
functionally analogous to the heart in bloodless animals)—
with the seat of the controlling sense-organ. As such it 
recapitulates the progress made in the search for a 
definition that explains not only how sleep arises in an 
animal but also the role that sleep has in animal life:  
 
Sleep is the paralysis of the first sense-organ 
preventing it from operating, and it occurs on 
the one hand (μὲν) of necessity—for it is not 
possible for the animal to exist should the 
conditions that produce it not obtain—and on 
the other hand (δὲ) for the preservation of the 
animal. (De somno 3, 458a28-32) 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
It has long been appreciated that Aristotle envisions the 
scientific inquiry as an enterprise that advances in stages.28 
The search for a scientific definition, and the corresponding 
explanation, of the phenomena of sleep and waking, is no 
exceptions to the rule. In fact, this search illustrates the 
Aristotelian strategy in an exemplary way. In addition to a 
pre-explanatory stage (ὅτι-stage) and an explanatory stage 
(διότι-stage) of investigation, the explanatory stage itself 
unfolds in stages.29 First of all, Aristotle determines what 
part is primarily and directly affected by sleep and waking. 
While it is true that the animal as a whole is asleep and 
awake, a scientific explanation is expected to single out the 
most precise description of the phenomena. This entails 
finding out the primary (or proximate) subject of change. 
At least for Aristotle, this is the heart (or whatever is 
functionally analogous to the heart). It is only when this 
important result is secured that Aristotle is able to turn to 
the search for the final and the moving causes of sleep and 
waking. While the final cause is identified by looking at the 
functional role that sleep and waking have in the life of 
animals, the primary (or proximate) moving cause is 
individuated by looking at the complex physiological 
                                                 
28 I refer the reader to Gotthelf 2012a: 394-398.  
29 Following Allan Gotthelf, (Gotthelf 2012b: 261-292), I speak of 
a pre-explanatory stage of inquiry in connection with the ὅτι-stage. 
The reason for this choice is that the collection of the data is 
never innocent with respect to their subsequent explanation. 
Quite the opposite: the relevant data are not only collected but 
also organized for their subsequent explanation. The study of 
sleep and waking is no exception to the rule. Hence, the ὅτι-stage 
is best understood as a pre-explanatory (rather than a non-
explanatory) stage of inquiry. 
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process (or processes) involved in any episode of sleep or 
waking. It should not go unnoticed that the final scientific 
explanation of sleep and waking does not make reference to 
matter or form. The reason is that matter and form are 
found only in natural substances (with the caveat that their 
extension to celestial substances is a thorny issue). At most, 
our explanation of sleep and waking will make reference to 
something that is analogue to matter—that is, the primary 
subject affected by sleep and waking. 30 
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